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NASA Wiring Program
Wiring System Technology
f
OBJECTIVE
\
To address safety and reliability issues of
complete wiring systems.
\
f PLANS
• Determine Wiring System Design Factors
• Investigate Circuit Protection Technologies
• Address Manufacturing and Maintenance
Procedures
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NASA Wiring Program
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Wiring System Failure Survey _.
if PURPOSE "_
Form a comprehensive view of wiring
safety, not only including the insulation,
but also taking into account the wiring
system factors.
.,4
Apollo 13 Review Board.
Space Shuttle Program
Office end Inspection Teams
(NASA Johnson,
NASA Kennedy,
NASA Marshall, and
contractors).
• NASA Payload Inspections
(NASA Marshall).
/" JUSTIFICATION "_
=or failures such as arc tracking and others to
happen, insulation degradation of some
degree must have occured. The wiring
system factors can often lead to degradation.
Overview of Space Missions with Wiring System Failures
Mission
Gemini 8
i Apollo 204
Apollo 13
STS-6
STS - 28
Cause
Electrical Widng Short
Damaged Insulation, Electrical
Spark, 100% O=
Damaged Insulation/Short
Circuit/Flawed Design
Abrasion of Insulation/Arc Tracking
Damaged Insulation/Am Tracking
Result
Shortened Mission -
Near Loss of Crew
Fire, 3 Astronauts Lost
Oxygen Tank Explosion,
Mission Incomplete
Wire Insulation Pyrolysis
6 Conductors Melted
Teleprinter Cable
Insulation Pyrolysis
Magellan Wrong Connection, Widng Short
Spacelab Damaged Insulation/Arc Tracking Wiring insulation Pyrolysis
During Maintenance
Delta 178/GOES-G Mechanical or Electrochemical
Insulation Damage Loss of Vehicle
ESA - Olympus Electrical Wtdng Short Loss of Solar Array
Wiring Insulation Pyrolysis -
Ground Processing
I
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Electrical Wiring System Failures
Influenced by a Combination of Factors
Wiring System Design
Circuit Protection Technology
Manufacturing/Maintenance Procedures
Insulation Construction/Material
Electrical Wiring System
Failures
EXAMPLES
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Wiring System Design
Space Shuttle (STS-28)
Odoinal Teleorinter Cable
Shuttle
Power
Panel
ConnecterJ
• Wire makes 180" bend.
• Repeated bending damaged
insulation.
Redesioned Teleodnter Cable
I Shuttle
• 90" Strain relief added.
• More flexible insulation used.
Wiring System Design
Command and Service Module (Apollo 13)
Oxygen Tank Failure
"_ _ H "into4'
Tanks contained ignition
sources, combustible
materials, and oxygen.
Electrical wiring conduit
constrictive.
Wiring in close proximity
to heaters.
Pressure against sharp
edges could lead to
"Cold Flow".
Failure modes were not
detectable by normal
post assembly testing.
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Maintenance Procedures
Space Shuttle Orbiters
Ba¢ killed (21.4%)
Dan_ge (114)
During 1984 and 1985 there
were 532 cable and connector
problems reported.
Totml. E32
• Problems resulted due to
maintenance procedures.
Circuit Protection Technology
Space Shuttle (STS-28)
Ar¢-trackino Current
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Circuit breskem based
on the thermal energy
in the fault, may be
Ineffective in detecting
arc-tracking.
• NASA Johnson Space
Center Test Program -
arc propagation
limited to lengths of
less than 1" up to 6".
• New technologies may
Improve detection.
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Electrical Wiring System
Improvements
EXAMPLES
Wiring System Design Improvements
• Awareness of designers to fault mechanisms.
° Specify new insulation constructions and materials
for use in NASA spacecraft.
Manufacturing/Maintenance Procedure
Improvements
• Improved training of personnel in "Wiring Awareness"
techniques
° Routing/Protecting of wiring to avoid physical damage
° Improved quality control, including non-intrusive
inspections
° Application of methods such as dynamic system
engineering and total quality management.
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Wiring Protection Measures
Space Shuttle Orbiters
_n=tur/
Tu_tz_g
Advanced Protection Technology
"Instantaneous Trip" Circuit Breakers
10,000
, 1.200
IJU
n-
"INSTANT \
imP"
i#_f, TRIIP UMIT
I0 m )2 m
"NEVER TRIP"
I
145%
110%
0.1 1.0 tO 1_
TIME-SECONDS
• Commercially Available Solid State
Power Controllers (SSPC)
• Air Force 270 VDC SSPC Program
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Advanced Protection Technology
"Smart" Fuses
Dual-element Time-delay Fuse
Ovgrlold
Element
I
Short-Circuit
Element
I I I
Tdgger Short - Circuit
Spdng Hem Absocber Unk
Calibrated
Fusing Alloy
Mid "S" Co_lnector
• Provide protection against low-level overload
current or a short circuit current.
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Advanced Protection Technology
"Intelligent" Fault Detection Methods
• Incipient fault detection via "footprint" or
"signature"
• Knowledge based expert systems
• Neural network methods
• Fuzzy logic methods
Summary
• The wiring system is an important consideration in
designing a spacecraft power system,
• Arc-tracking has recently been identified as a failure mode
which may not be completely eliminated through the use of
new wiring constructions/materials
• The total wiring system including insulation, system
design, handling procedures, and circuit protection need to
be considered further.
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